Gaullism After de Gaulle

Charles de Gaulle's death in November 1970 posed an existential question: could Gaullism survive without de Gaulle? The general had created institutions, articulated principles, and inspired movements, but his charisma was irreplaceable. His successors would discover that inheriting his legacy was easier than embodying it.

Pompidou: The Faithful Heir

Georges Pompidou, elected president in 1969, seemed the natural successor. De Gaulle's prime minister for six years, he understood both Gaullist principles and political realities. But Pompidou was a different man—a banker and literature professor where de Gaulle was a soldier and mystic, pragmatic where de Gaulle was visionary.

Pompidou's presidency (1969-1974) maintained Gaullist forms while adapting substance. He continued the nuclear program and independent foreign policy but improved relations with America and supported British entry into the EEC. He preserved strong executive authority but showed more flexibility toward parliament and parties. Most significantly, he embraced modernization without the general's ambivalence about its social effects.

Under Pompidou, France completed its transformation into a modern industrial society. The Paris peripherique, the Beaubourg museum, and new towns embodied a vision of France as dynamic and forward-looking rather than eternally traditional. This was Gaullism without grandeur—effective governance without mystical purpose.

But Pompidou understood he was a transitional figure. Dying of cancer (though this was hidden from the public), he worked to institutionalize Gaullism through the UDR party and groom successors. His sudden death in April 1974 precipitated a succession crisis that revealed Gaullism's fragility without its founder.

The Gaullist Family Feud

The 1974 presidential election exposed deep divisions within Gaullism. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Pompidou's former prime minister, claimed the official Gaullist mantle but represented its modernizing, social wing. His "New Society" program promised to adapt Gaullism to post-1968 realities through dialogue and reform.

But many Gaullists saw Chaban as too liberal, too willing to compromise core principles. They coalesced around Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who despite not being a Gaullist, promised to maintain the Fifth Republic's institutions. When Giscard narrowly defeated Socialist François Mitterrand, Gaullism had lost the presidency while preserving the presidential system.

Jacques Chirac emerged as the new Gaullist leader, refounding the movement as the Rally for the Republic (RPR) in 1976. Chirac's Gaullism was more organizational than ideological—a political machine built on local networks and patronage rather than mystical vision. He claimed de Gaulle's mantle while practicing politics the general would have despised.

Mitterrand's Paradox

François Mitterrand's 1981 election seemed to end Gaullism definitively. The man who had denounced de Gaulle's "permanent coup d'état" in 1964 now became the Fifth Republic's first socialist president. Many expected him to dismantle Gaullist institutions and restore parliamentary democracy.

Instead, Mitterrand became the most Gaullist of de Gaulle's successors. He wielded presidential power with regal authority, making the Élysée even more monarchical. He pursued grandeur through grand projects—the Louvre pyramid, the Bastille Opera, the Grande Arche. He maintained nuclear independence and projected French power globally.

Most remarkably, Mitterrand defended Gaullist institutions against his own party. When Socialists proposed reducing presidential terms or powers, he resisted. When forced to "cohabit" with Gaullist prime minister Chirac (1986-1988), he used presidential prerogatives to maintain influence. The socialist had become the system's greatest defender.

This paradox revealed a profound truth: de Gaulle had created institutions that shaped their occupants more than occupants shaped institutions. The Fifth Republic's presidency imposed its logic on whoever held it. Critics who gained power discovered that Gaullist structures enabled effective governance. The general's constitutional vision had triumphed over ideology.

Chirac: The Last Gaullist?

Jacques Chirac's long march to the presidency (achieved in 1995) represented both Gaullism's persistence and transformation. As president (1995-2007), Chirac invoked de Gaulle constantly while practicing politics antithetical to Gaullist principles. Where de Gaulle disdained parties, Chirac was the consummate party politician. Where de Gaulle maintained austere distance, Chirac cultivated folksy popularity.

Yet on crucial occasions, ancestral Gaullism emerged. Chirac's 2003 opposition to the Iraq War channeled de Gaulle's anti-American independence. His recognition of French responsibility for Vichy's crimes broke with de Gaulle's mythology but honored deeper Gaullist themes of national honesty. His defense of "French exceptionalism" against Anglo-Saxon liberalism echoed the general's civilizational concerns.

Chirac's presidency marked Gaullism's exhaustion as a distinct movement. The RPR merged into the broader center-right UMP. Gaullist themes—national independence, state authority, social cohesion—persisted but lost their specific identity. By 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy could win the presidency as heir to Chirac while explicitly rejecting Gaullist foreign policy traditions.

The Sarkozy Rupture

Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency (2007-2012) represented conscious rupture with Gaullism. He reintegrated France into NATO command structures, embraced American alliance, and promoted "bling-bling" style antithetical to Gaullist gravitas. His hyperactive presidency violated de Gaulle's maxim that authority requires distance.

Yet even Sarkozy could not escape Gaullist logic. The 2008 financial crisis saw massive state intervention to save French banks and industry. Presidential authority was wielded even more intensively than under de Gaulle. Constitutional reforms marginally reduced presidential power but maintained essential structures. The rupture was more style than substance.

Sarkozy's defeat revealed another Gaullist legacy: French rejection of leaders who violate national dignity. His perceived subservience to America, vulgar style, and divisive rhetoric offended Gaullist sensibilities that transcended party lines. The French still expected their president to embody, however imperfectly, de Gaulle's "certain idea of France."