The Algerian Crisis

By May 1958, the Fourth Republic was in its death throes. In Algeria, a million French settlers (pieds-noirs) and an increasingly desperate army faced a mounting Arab insurgency. In Paris, governments fell with clockwork regularity, unable to choose between negotiation and repression. On May 13, French settlers and paratroopers seized government buildings in Algiers, demanding a "government of public safety." Civil war loomed.

From Colombey, de Gaulle watched with calculated ambiguity. He had said nothing publicly about Algeria since 1955, maintaining the sphinx-like silence that allowed all sides to project their hopes onto him. The settlers believed he would keep Algeria French—hadn't he proclaimed France from "Dunkirk to Tamanrasset"? The army trusted the man who had restored French honor in 1940. Even some Muslims hoped this strong leader might bring peace.

The Return to Power

De Gaulle's return was a masterpiece of political maneuvering. He refused to endorse the Algiers putsch but would not condemn it. He declared himself "ready to assume the powers of the Republic" but insisted on legal investiture. He met secretly with political leaders while publicly maintaining olympian detachment.

The key moment came on May 19 when he held a press conference—his first in three years. With studied casualness, he dismissed fears of dictatorship: "Do you think that at 67 I'm going to begin a career as a dictator?" He spoke vaguely of necessary reforms, national unity, and French grandeur. On Algeria, he said nothing concrete, maintaining the ambiguity that was his greatest asset.

President René Coty, facing military rebellion and political paralysis, turned to de Gaulle as the only figure who could prevent civil war. But the General's conditions were steep: full powers for six months, authorization to draft a new constitution, and its submission to referendum. The National Assembly, faced with the choice between de Gaulle and chaos, chose de Gaulle. On June 1, 1958, he became the last Prime Minister of the Fourth Republic.

"Je vous ai compris"

De Gaulle's first major act was to fly to Algeria. On June 4, from the balcony of the Government-General building in Algiers, he addressed a vast crowd of settlers and Muslims. His opening words—"Je vous ai compris!" (I have understood you!)—sent the crowd into ecstasy. But what had he understood? What was he promising?

The speech was a masterpiece of calculated ambiguity. He praised the army, acknowledged settler fears, and promised that all Algerians would become "Frenchmen with full rights." But he never said Algeria would remain French. Each listener heard what they wanted to hear. The settlers heard confirmation of Algérie française. Muslims heard promises of equality. The army heard support for their mission.

Only de Gaulle's closest associates noticed the careful phrasing, the options left open. When he spoke of "ten million Frenchmen" in Algeria, did he mean settlers alone or all inhabitants? When he promised "renewal," did he mean integration or transformation? The ambiguity was deliberate, buying time to consolidate power and assess options.

Creating the Fifth Republic

While managing the Algerian crisis, de Gaulle simultaneously created new political institutions. The constitution of the Fifth Republic, drafted under Michel Debré's supervision but reflecting de Gaulle's vision, revolutionized French governance. The president, elected for seven years, would no longer be a figurehead but the true executive, with power to dissolve parliament, appoint the prime minister, and rule by decree in emergencies.

The referendum campaign revealed de Gaulle at his most persuasive. He presented the choice starkly: his constitution or chaos. He used television—still new in French politics—with instinctive mastery, speaking directly to citizens over the heads of political parties. His message was simple: France needed authority to act, stability to prosper, grandeur to survive.

On September 28, 1958, 79% of voters approved the new constitution. In December, de Gaulle was elected President of the Republic by an electoral college, receiving 78% of the vote. The General who had refused to bow to party politics in 1946 now possessed the institutional power he had always sought. But the Algerian war still raged, threatening to consume his presidency as it had the Fourth Republic.

The Evolution on Algeria

De Gaulle's Algerian policy evolved through painful stages, each marked by ambiguity and contradiction. Initially, he seemed to support integration, launching the Constantine Plan for massive economic development. He promoted Muslims to senior positions, extended voting rights, and spoke of "France from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset."

But privately, he was already considering alternatives. Demographics were inexorable—nine million Muslims could not be permanently dominated by one million Europeans. Full integration would mean 60 Muslim deputies in the National Assembly, transforming French politics. "Do you want Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées?" he asked associates privately.

The September 1959 speech marked a crucial turn. De Gaulle offered Algeria three options: full independence (which he called "secession"), complete integration, or association with France. He promised self-determination through referendum. The settlers were stunned—this was not what they expected from their savior. "Barricades Week" in January 1960 saw settler ultras attempting another putsch, but de Gaulle, appearing on television in his brigadier's uniform, rallied the nation and the army to legality.

The Generals' Putsch

The crisis deepened through 1960 and early 1961. De Gaulle's references to an "Algerian Algeria" and negotiations with the FLN (National Liberation Front) convinced military hardliners that he was betraying the sacred cause. On April 21, 1961, four generals—including Raoul Salan, former commander in Algeria—launched a putsch in Algiers.

For four days, the Republic trembled. Would the army follow its generals or its president? De Gaulle's response was decisive. On television, wearing his uniform, he denounced "a quartet of retired generals" and invoked Article 16, assuming emergency powers. He appealed directly to conscript soldiers: "I forbid any Frenchman, and above all any soldier, to execute any of their orders."

The putsch collapsed. Conscripts refused to follow rebel officers. Even elite paratroop units hesitated. The generals fled or surrendered. But from the ashes arose the OAS (Secret Army Organization), determined to keep Algeria French through terror. Their campaign—bombings, assassinations, attempts on de Gaulle's life—would poison the final year of the war.

The Évian Accords

By 1961, de Gaulle had concluded that Algeria must be independent. The war was unwinnable militarily, unsustainable politically, and incompatible with his vision of France's future. But extraction had to be managed to preserve French interests and protect those who had trusted France.

The negotiations at Évian were tortuous. The FLN wanted immediate and total independence. De Gaulle sought guarantees for European settlers, continued French use of Saharan nuclear test sites and the Mers-el-Kébir naval base, and preferential economic relationships. The resulting accords, signed March 18, 1962, were a compromise that satisfied no one completely but ended the war.

The aftermath was tragic. Despite guarantees, most Europeans fled Algeria in a massive, chaotic exodus. Muslims who had served France—the harkis—were largely abandoned, thousands massacred by the FLN. The OAS's scorched-earth campaign destroyed much infrastructure. Algeria achieved independence, but at terrible cost.