Wars and Diplomatic Revolution

Louis XV's foreign policy oscillated between pacific inclinations and dynastic ambitions, achieving little while exhausting finances. The War of Polish Succession (1733-1738), fought to place Louis's father-in-law on Poland's throne, gained Lorraine for France but at considerable cost. The War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) saw initial victories—Louis personally commanded at Fontenoy (1745)—but ended with mutual restoration of conquests, prompting the bitter comment that France had fought "for the King of Prussia."

The Diplomatic Revolution of 1756, engineered by Austrian diplomat Kaunitz with French foreign minister Choiseul's cooperation, overturned centuries of Franco-Habsburg rivalry. France's alliance with Austria against Prussia and Britain reflected new geopolitical realities but shocked traditional opinion. The Seven Years' War (1756-1763) that followed proved catastrophic, with France losing most of its colonial empire to Britain while achieving nothing in Europe. The Treaty of Paris (1763) confirmed British dominance in North America and India, reducing France to secondary colonial status.

These military failures had profound domestic consequences. War expenses created fiscal crises requiring new taxes that privileged groups resisted. Military defeats undermined royal prestige and fueled criticism of government incompetence. The loss of colonial markets damaged commercial interests tied to monarchy. Most importantly, France's reduced international status contradicted absolutist claims about royal glory and grandeur. The monarchy that had dominated Europe under Louis XIV now appeared impotent against rising powers like Prussia and Britain.

Naval inadequacy particularly highlighted systemic failures. Despite Fleury's and Choiseul's efforts at naval construction, France could not match British sea power. The navy's aristocratic officer corps resisted professional reforms while colonial merchants demanded protection the crown could not provide. Naval defeats—Lagos and Quiberon Bay (1759)—demonstrated that continental military strength meant little in global competition. The monarchy's inability to adapt to new forms of warfare symbolized broader failures of adaptation.