The Old General and the Young Rebels

Charles de Gaulle, the 77-year-old President of the Fifth Republic, seemed an unlikely target for revolution. The man who had embodied French resistance to Nazi occupation, who had restored France's international prestige, who had given the country stable government after years of chaos, now faced the greatest challenge of his political life from his own citizens. The confrontation between the aging general and the youthful rebels of May '68 was more than a political conflict — it was a collision between two incompatible visions of France and authority itself.

De Gaulle's Misreading

In early May, de Gaulle fundamentally misunderstood what was happening. To him, the student protests were mere "bed-wetting" (chienlit) — childish disorder that firm paternal authority could easily contain. He had faced down generals attempting coups, negotiated Algeria's independence against fierce opposition, and built the Fifth Republic from the ruins of the Fourth. Surely, he reasoned, dealing with unruly students would be simple.

This misreading proved nearly fatal. De Gaulle's generation had endured depression, war, and occupation. They valued order, hierarchy, and national grandeur above all. He could not comprehend a generation that took prosperity for granted and yearned for authenticity, creativity, and personal liberation. His paternalistic rhetoric — addressing the nation as "mes enfants" — only inflamed young people who wanted to be treated as autonomous adults.

On May 14, de Gaulle left for a state visit to Romania, confident his prime minister could handle the disturbances. The timing could not have been worse. While he discussed diplomatic minutiae in Bucharest, France exploded. His absence became a symbol of how out of touch the regime had become. Students mocked him with slogans like "De Gaulle to the museum!" and "Ten years is enough!"

The Government's Paralysis

The government's response oscillated between repression and concession, satisfying no one. Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, more attuned to public opinion than de Gaulle, recognized the movement's seriousness. But he was caught between hardliners demanding crushing force and moderates counseling dialogue. The result was incoherence that emboldened protesters.

Interior Minister Christian Fouchet represented the hardline position. A Gaullist stalwart who saw students as spoiled troublemakers manipulated by foreign agitators, he favored maximum repression. His deployment of CRS riot police into the Sorbonne on May 3 transformed a minor protest into a mass movement. Each escalation of police violence produced greater solidarity with students.

Education Minister Alain Peyrefitte embodied the government's confusion. Intellectually sympathetic to some student demands, he lacked authority to implement reforms. His attempts at dialogue were undermined by police violence. His offers of minor concessions were rejected as too little, too late. He became a symbol of regime impotence, eventually resigning in despair.

The Communist Party's Dilemma

The French Communist Party (PCF), the country's largest leftist organization with deep roots in the working class, faced an existential crisis. For decades, it had advocated revolution while practicing reformism. Now, with revolution apparently at hand, the party leadership recoiled in horror. The spontaneous uprising threatened their bureaucratic control more than capitalism itself.

Georges Marchais, soon to be party leader, denounced the students as "false revolutionaries" and "sons of the bourgeoisie." The party newspaper L'Humanité initially ignored the movement, then attacked it as adventurist. When forced to acknowledge the massive strikes, Communist leaders tried desperately to channel them into traditional demands for wages and working conditions.

This conservative stance reflected multiple fears. The party's aging leadership, formed in Stalinist traditions, distrusted any movement they didn't control. They feared losing influence to New Left groups. They worried about government repression if associated with violence. Most fundamentally, they had become comfortable managers of working-class discontent rather than revolutionary organizers.

The Socialist Impasse

The non-Communist left, fragmented into multiple parties and factions, proved equally inadequate. François Mitterrand, leader of the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left, saw the crisis primarily as an opportunity to replace de Gaulle through electoral means. His legalistic approach — calling for a "provisional government" — seemed absurdly inadequate to the revolutionary moment.

Pierre Mendès France, the moral conscience of the democratic left, commanded respect from students but lacked organizational power. His appearance at the Charléty stadium rally on May 27 electrified the crowd, but he offered no concrete program for transforming enthusiasm into power. The non-Communist left's failure to provide revolutionary leadership left a vacuum that would prove decisive.

The PSU (Unified Socialist Party), closer to student radicals, played a more active role. Michel Rocard and other young leaders participated in occupations and demonstrations. But the PSU remained small, caught between revolutionary rhetoric and reformist practice. It influenced the movement's ideas more than its trajectory.

The Far Left's Hour

May '68 was the far left's moment of glory and ultimate frustration. Trotskyist, Maoist, and anarchist groups that had labored in obscurity suddenly found mass audiences for their ideas. The JCR (Revolutionary Communist Youth), the UJCml (Union of Marxist-Leninist Communist Youth), and various other groupuscules provided many of the movement's most dedicated activists.

These groups brought theoretical sophistication, international connections, and revolutionary commitment. They analyzed capitalism's contradictions, explained imperialism's crimes, and envisioned socialist alternatives. Their newspapers, selling in hundreds of thousands, spread radical ideas throughout the movement. Their militants often displayed extraordinary courage in confrontations with police.

Yet the far left also revealed fatal limitations. Divided by arcane ideological disputes — was the Soviet Union state capitalist or a degenerated workers' state? — they couldn't unite even in revolutionary circumstances. Their language, full of Marxist jargon, often alienated workers and students seeking concrete alternatives. Most critically, they had no strategy for actually taking power.

De Gaulle's Disappearance

The crisis reached its climax on May 29 when de Gaulle simply vanished. Scheduled to chair a cabinet meeting, he instead helicoptered to Baden-Baden in Germany to meet General Massu, commander of French forces there. For six hours, France had no idea where its president was. Rumors flew: had he fled? Was he preparing a military coup? Had he suffered a breakdown?

De Gaulle's disappearance remains controversial. He later claimed he went to ensure military loyalty. Critics suggested he panicked and considered fleeing. Most likely, he combined personal despair with political calculation. By disappearing, he created a vacuum that reminded France what his absence might mean. The old performer knew how to build dramatic tension.

What de Gaulle discovered in Baden-Baden was crucial: the army remained loyal. General Massu, the tough paratrooper who had crushed Algerian resistance, assured him of military support. But Massu also delivered hard truths: the situation was critical, force alone wouldn't restore order, and political solutions were necessary. Fortified by military backing and personal resolve, de Gaulle prepared his counterstroke.

The Return and the Speech

De Gaulle returned to Paris on May 30 and delivered the speech that turned the tide. In just four minutes on radio — he refused television to emphasize gravity — he transformed the political landscape. His voice, usually measured, crackled with energy. He would not resign. He would not replace the prime minister. He dissolved the National Assembly and called new elections.

But the masterstroke was his language. He spoke not of reform or dialogue but of defending the Republic against "totalitarian communism." He invoked the threat of civil war. He called on "civic action" to defend order. He transformed a complex social movement into a simple choice: himself or chaos. For many French citizens exhausted by strikes and disorder, it was no choice at all.

Within hours, hundreds of thousands of government supporters flooded the Champs-Élysées. This counter-demonstration, larger than any leftist march, revealed the movement's limits. The "silent majority" — middle-class citizens, small business owners, conservative workers — had found their voice. They wanted order restored, whatever the cost. The revolutionary tide began to ebb.

The Role of Fear

Fear played a crucial role in the political dynamics. The government feared revolution but also used fear strategically. Talk of communist plots, foreign agitation, and imminent civil war mobilized conservative opinion. The specter of disorder — empty shops, striking services, occupied workplaces — frightened those with something to lose.

But fear worked both ways. Many movement participants feared military intervention. Memories of previous repressions — the Paris Commune, the 1947 strikes — haunted older activists. When paratroopers moved closer to Paris in late May, the threat seemed real. This fear of violent repression limited how far many were willing to push.

The middle classes feared most of all. Small shopkeepers worried about their businesses. Professional employees feared career damage. Parents feared for their children's futures. This broad coalition of fear ultimately proved stronger than the coalition of hope that had briefly flourished in May.

International Pressures

The Cold War context profoundly shaped May's political dynamics. The Soviet Union, despite revolutionary rhetoric, wanted stability in Western Europe. Through the French Communist Party, Moscow urged moderation and compromise. The Prague Spring was providing enough headaches without adding French chaos.

The United States watched nervously. Could France, a NATO cornerstone, go communist? The CIA increased intelligence gathering. Contingency plans for various scenarios were developed. But American intervention remained indirect, recognizing that overt action would backfire. Washington's main concern was preventing Soviet exploitation of the crisis.

European neighbors offered support to de Gaulle while preparing for potential spillover. West Germany, with its own student movement, particularly feared contagion. The European Economic Community worried about economic disruption. International capitalism needed French stability. These pressures reinforced conservative forces within France.

The Failure of Revolutionary Politics

Why did a movement that brought France to the brink of revolution ultimately fail politically? Multiple factors converged. The movement lacked unified leadership or clear program. Students and workers had different immediate interests. No credible alternative government emerged. The forces of order retained cohesion while revolutionaries remained divided.

Most fundamentally, the movement failed to split the state apparatus. The army remained loyal. The police, despite exhaustion, continued functioning. The civil service, while sometimes sympathetic, didn't defect en masse. Without breaking the state's repressive capacity, revolution remained impossible.

The movement also failed to expand sufficiently beyond its base. Rural France remained largely uninvolved. The middle classes turned hostile. Even within the working class, perhaps a third actively supported the movement, a third opposed, and a third remained neutral. This wasn't enough for revolutionary transformation.

De Gaulle's Victory and Defeat

De Gaulle won the immediate political battle. The June elections gave Gaullists an overwhelming majority. Order was restored. Reforms were limited and controlled. The revolutionary moment passed. The old general had proven his political mastery one final time.

Yet it was a Pyrrhic victory. De Gaulle himself recognized that something fundamental had changed. The paternalistic authority he embodied had been definitively challenged. Within a year, he would resign after losing a minor referendum, understanding that his time had passed. May '68 had defeated de Gaulle more thoroughly than any election could.

The political dynamics of May '68 revealed the exhaustion of France's post-war system. Neither Gaullism's authoritarian paternalism nor Communism's bureaucratic opposition could address new aspirations. The failure to find political expression for social revolution would haunt French politics for decades. The questions raised in May — about democracy, participation, and the meaning of politics itself — remained unanswered, ensuring that the spirit of '68 would return in new forms.# The End and Aftermath - June Elections and Beyond