The March to Moscow

The Russian campaign began with the crossing of the Niemen River on June 24, 1812, but within weeks revealed fundamental problems that would doom the entire enterprise. The Grande Armée's enormous size, intended to ensure victory, became a logistical nightmare that French supply systems could not support. The army consumed its supplies faster than they could be replaced, while Russian forces avoided the decisive battle that might have ended the campaign quickly.

The Russian strategy of strategic withdrawal was partly planned and partly inevitable. Russian forces, though numerous, were scattered across vast territory and could not concentrate quickly enough to meet Napoleon's advance. Yet this apparent weakness became a strength as French forces advanced deeper into hostile territory while their supply lines stretched to the breaking point.

The Battle of Borodino on September 7, 1812, was the bloodiest single day in Napoleonic warfare, with over 70,000 casualties from both armies. Though Napoleon claimed victory and the road to Moscow lay open, the battle's cost was prohibitive. The Grande Armée lost irreplaceable veterans while Russian forces, though defeated, maintained their organization and fighting spirit.

The occupation of Moscow in September 1812 represented the campaign's pyrrhic climax. Napoleon expected the capture of Russia's ancient capital to force peace negotiations, but the city's evacuation and subsequent burning eliminated the political and logistical benefits of victory. The Grande Armée found itself in possession of a ruined city as winter approached, with no clear path to victory.