Allies and Adversaries

De Gaulle's relationship with his Anglo-American allies was complex, often contentious, and crucial to understanding his wartime leadership. From the beginning, he faced a fundamental paradox: he depended entirely on British support but had to assert French independence to maintain legitimacy. This balancing act led to countless confrontations that exasperated his allies but established France's claim to great power status.

Churchill: The Indispensable Adversary

Winston Churchill's relationship with de Gaulle was one of the war's great dramas—a mixture of admiration, frustration, genuine affection, and barely controlled rage. Churchill had enabled de Gaulle's movement, providing crucial early support when others saw only a presumptuous brigadier. But he quickly discovered that his protégé had steel in his spine and an uncompromising view of French dignity.

Their clashes were legendary. When Churchill tried to conduct Middle Eastern operations without consulting de Gaulle, the general threatened to withdraw Free French cooperation entirely. When the British occupied Syria and Lebanon in 1941, initially excluding Free French forces, de Gaulle's fury was incandescent. "I am too poor to bow," he told Churchill during one confrontation.

Yet beneath the battles was genuine respect. Churchill recognized in de Gaulle the mystical patriotism that he himself felt for Britain. After one particularly heated argument, Churchill remarked to an aide, "Of all the crosses I have had to bear, the Cross of Lorraine has been the heaviest—but I bear it still." De Gaulle, for his part, never forgot that without Churchill's initial support, Free France would have died in infancy.

Roosevelt: The American Problem

If Churchill was a difficult friend, Franklin Roosevelt was an openly skeptical adversary. The American president distrusted de Gaulle from the start, seeing him as an undemocratic adventurer with dictatorial ambitions. Roosevelt's vision for post-war France—a period of Allied military government followed by eventual elections—had no place for de Gaulle's claim to immediate legitimacy.

The conflict went beyond personalities. Roosevelt represented American power and American assumptions about the post-war world. He envisioned a world dominated by the "Four Policemen"—the United States, Britain, Soviet Union, and China—with little room for a restored France. De Gaulle represented not just French nationalism but European resistance to American hegemony.

Their encounters were disasters. At the Casablanca Conference in 1943, Roosevelt treated de Gaulle with barely concealed contempt, forcing him into a humiliating public handshake with General Henri Giraud, the American-backed alternative to de Gaulle. De Gaulle's response was to outmaneuver Giraud politically, gradually assuming complete control of the French Committee of National Liberation.

The American opposition had serious consequences. Roosevelt refused to recognize de Gaulle's provisional government, excluded him from major Allied conferences, and even contemplated replacing him with a more amenable figure. American officials in liberated French territories initially tried to impose military government, treating France as conquered territory rather than an ally.

Stalin: The Surprising Understanding

Paradoxically, de Gaulle found more understanding from Stalin than from his democratic allies. When de Gaulle visited Moscow in December 1944, the Soviet dictator received him as the leader of a great power. Stalin understood power and respected those who wielded it effectively. De Gaulle's authoritarian style and mystical nationalism were more comprehensible to him than to the Anglo-Americans.

Their negotiations were hard-headed and realistic. Stalin wanted French support for Soviet positions in Eastern Europe. De Gaulle wanted Soviet recognition and support for French interests in Germany. They reached a pragmatic agreement—the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance—that served both their interests.

But de Gaulle was under no illusions about Stalin or communism. He had excluded communists from Free France until 1943, when Soviet entry into the war made cooperation essential. He recognized the French Communist Party's role in the Resistance but was determined to prevent communist domination of post-war France. His relationship with Stalin was tactical, not ideological.

The French Rivals

De Gaulle's most bitter conflicts were often with other French leaders. General Henri Giraud, a brave soldier who had escaped from German captivity, was promoted by the Americans as an alternative to de Gaulle. Giraud had military credentials but no political skills. In the power struggle that followed, de Gaulle systematically outmaneuvered him, demonstrating the political acumen that his enemies had underestimated.

More complex was de Gaulle's relationship with the internal Resistance. Leaders like Henri Frenay and Emmanuel d'Astier de La Vigerie had risked their lives while de Gaulle remained safely in London. They resented his assumption of authority and his tendency to treat them as subordinates rather than partners. The tragic death of Jean Moulin in 1943, after betrayal and torture by the Gestapo, removed the one figure who might have bridged these divisions.

The communists presented a particular challenge. As the most organized and disciplined element of the Resistance, they claimed a leading role in post-war France. De Gaulle needed their support but feared their power. His strategy was to acknowledge their contribution while preventing their domination—a delicate balance that required all his political skills.