The Return

On August 25, 1944, Charles de Gaulle entered Paris as a conqueror who had never commanded more than a division in battle, as a head of government who had never been elected to any office, as the symbol of a France that existed more in aspiration than reality. The next two years would determine whether the mystique of resistance could translate into the mundane but essential tasks of governance.

The scene at the Ministry of War that afternoon captured all the complexities ahead. Resistance leaders waited at the Hôtel de Ville, expecting de Gaulle to come to them—to acknowledge their role in liberating Paris. Instead, he went directly to the Ministry, asserting the continuity of state authority. When pressed to proclaim the Republic from the balcony of the Hôtel de Ville, he refused with characteristic hauteur: "The Republic has never ceased to exist."

This was more than symbolism. De Gaulle understood that France stood at a crossroads. One path led to revolutionary transformation, possibly communist-dominated, certainly chaotic. The other led to restoration of state authority, painful but necessary reconstruction, and the reestablishment of France as a great power. Every gesture, every decision in these crucial months would help determine which path France would take.

The Provisional Government Takes Shape

De Gaulle's provisional government was a masterpiece of political balance. He included representatives from all major Resistance movements—communists, socialists, Christian democrats—but ensured his own men held key positions. The communists received ministries (Air, Health, Labor) but not the crucial ones they wanted (Interior, War, Foreign Affairs).

The appointment process revealed de Gaulle's method. When communist leader Maurice Thorez, recently returned from Moscow, demanded the Interior Ministry, de Gaulle listened politely, then appointed his own man. When socialist leaders pushed for radical economic reforms, he agreed in principle while controlling the pace of implementation. He gave everyone something, no one everything.

His cabinet meetings were exercises in controlled authority. Ministers found themselves facing not a chairman among equals but a head of state who had already decided most issues. "I listened to their views with attention," de Gaulle later wrote, "then I decided." This autocratic style irritated many but provided the decisive leadership France desperately needed.

The Purge: Justice and Revenge

No issue was more explosive than dealing with collaborators. Popular fury demanded vengeance—women who had consorting with Germans had their heads shaved, suspected collaborators were lynched, personal scores were settled under cover of patriotic justice. Perhaps 10,000 people died in summary executions during and immediately after liberation.

De Gaulle moved quickly to channel this fury into legal forms. Special courts were established to try cases of collaboration. The High Court of Justice would try Pétain and other major figures. Military tribunals dealt with cases involving armed action against the Resistance. Civic chambers handled lesser cases of "national indignity."

The process was messy, often unjust. Some major collaborators escaped while minor figures suffered severely. The trials became theaters where France examined its conscience—or avoided doing so. The writer Robert Brasillach was executed for intellectual collaboration while businessmen who had profited from German contracts often escaped with fines.

De Gaulle's own attitude was complex. He commuted many death sentences, understanding that reconciliation required mercy. But he allowed others to proceed, recognizing that justice—however imperfect—was necessary for national healing. When Pétain was sentenced to death in August 1945, de Gaulle immediately commuted it to life imprisonment, honoring the Marshal's service in World War I while condemning his actions in World War II.

Economic Crisis and Social Reform

Liberation brought joy but not prosperity. France's infrastructure was shattered—bridges blown, railways cut, ports mined. Industrial production was at 40% of pre-war levels. Food shortages were acute; rationing would continue until 1949. The black market flourished while ordinary citizens struggled to survive.

De Gaulle's economic policy combined pragmatism with vision. Immediate needs came first—restore transport, restart factories, feed the population. But he also launched fundamental reforms that would reshape French society. The nationalizations of 1944-45—coal mines, gas and electricity, major banks, Renault—were partly socialist ideology, partly practical necessity, mostly assertion of state power over an economy that had failed France in the 1930s.

The social reforms were equally sweeping. The Social Security system, established in 1945, provided comprehensive health and retirement benefits. Family allowances encouraged the birth rate that de Gaulle saw as essential to French power. Works committees gave employees a voice in management. These reforms, guided by the Resistance program, created the framework of France's post-war welfare state.

Women finally received the vote—a reform de Gaulle had promised in Algiers and delivered in 1944. It was overdue recognition of women's role in the Resistance and the economy. Yet characteristically, de Gaulle coupled this progressive step with conservative rhetoric about women's "natural" role as mothers and homemakers. French women could vote, but the political culture remained overwhelmingly masculine.

Foreign Policy: Restoring Grandeur

For de Gaulle, domestic reconstruction was inseparable from restoring French international standing. A France that was merely prosperous would be a larger Belgium. France must be a great power or cease to be France. This meant a permanent UN Security Council seat, equal status with the Anglo-Americans in occupying Germany, a voice in shaping the post-war world.

His methods alternated between grand gesture and patient negotiation. When excluded from the Yalta Conference in February 1945, he signed a treaty with the Soviet Union, demonstrating France's independent foreign policy. When the Americans tried to exclude France from the occupation of Germany, he simply ordered French troops to occupy Stuttgart, presenting the Allies with a fait accompli.

The colonial empire posed particular challenges. De Gaulle understood that the war had fundamentally changed colonial relationships. His response was the Brazzaville Declaration of 1944, promising evolution toward self-government within a French Union. But when Syrian and Lebanese nationalists demanded immediate independence, he tried to reimpose French authority by force. British intervention forced French withdrawal—a humiliation de Gaulle never forgave.

In Indochina, the situation was even more complex. Japanese occupation had shattered French prestige. Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh had established de facto control in much of the country. De Gaulle sent General Leclerc to restore French authority, beginning a conflict that would poison French politics for a decade. His combination of rhetorical flexibility and practical inflexibility on colonial issues would prove a fatal flaw.